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This paper presents a micro data approach to the identification of credit crunches. Using a 
survey among German firms which regularly queries the firms’ assessment of the current 
willingness of banks to extend credit we estimate the probability of a restrictive credit supply 
policy by time taking into account the creditworthiness of borrowers. Creditworthiness is 
approximated by firm–specific factors, e.g. the firms’ assessment of their current business 
situation and their business expectations. After controlling for the banks’ refinancing costs, 
which are also likely to affect the supply of loans, we derive a credit crunch indicator, which 
measures that part of the shift in the willingness to lend that is neither explained by firm-
specific factors nor by refinancing costs. 
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Foundation. 1 Introduction
The world ﬁnancial crisis that originated from the US subprime mortgage crisis
of 2007 has shown a signiﬁcant impact on the credit market in Germany. The
annual growth rate of the outstanding amount of loans from German banks
to non–ﬁnancial corporations fell from more than 10 percent by the end of
2008 to –2.5 percent in November 2009. Since in Germany bank loans are
a key source of external ﬁnance for ﬁrms, representing about 40 percent of
nonﬁnancial corporations’ debt, there was a lively discussion about whether the
German economy is experiencing a credit crunch.
Following Udell (2009), “economists generally deﬁne a credit crunch as a
signiﬁcant contraction in the supply of credit reﬂected in a tightening of credit
conditions.” There is a large literature that has utilized macroeconomic data,
such as the mix of bank loans and commercial paper, interest rate spreads, and
total bank loans, to identify shifts in loan supply (Bernanke, 1983; Bernanke
and Blinder, 1992; Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox, 1993;
Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein, 1994; Ding, Domac, and Ferri, 1998). However,
approaches using aggregate data have been criticized for not having adequately
isolated loan supply shocks from loan demand shocks. In fact, as Bernanke and
Gertler (1995) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) argue, when the economy is
hit by a negative shock, it is often impossible to distinguish whether the usual
deceleration in bank lending stems from a shift in demand or supply. On the
one hand, the corporate sector may be demanding less credit because fewer
investments are undertaken; on the other hand, it could be that banks are less
willing to lend and, therefore, charge higher interest rates or decline more credit
applications.
In this paper we circumvent the identiﬁcation problem of the macroeconomic
approach by applying a micro data approach that uses information about the
credit supply behavior of banks obtained from a regular survey among ﬁrms.
In this survey ﬁrms are asked to give their perception of the current willing-
ness of banks to extend credit to businesses. We interpret the responses to the
credit question as information from the point of view of the ﬁrms about the
banks credit supply conditions. Given this assumption our micro–econometric
2approach mimics the decision of a loan oﬃcer to grant credit to a ﬁrm by eval-
uating the creditworthiness of the ﬁrm subject to bank–speciﬁc restrictions. A
major advantage of the survey is that it also provides ample information about
the quality of each ﬁrm. The starting point of our analysis is Bernanke and Lown
(1991) who also “deﬁne a bank credit crunch as a signiﬁcant leftward shift in the
supply curve for loans”. They however emphasize that in any empirical approach
the econometrician needs to hold “constant both the safe real interest rate and
the quality of potential borrowers” in order to properly separate a credit crunch
from ‘normal’ shifts in loan supply curve, which may be triggered by changes in
the creditworthiness of borrowers or changes in the banks’ reﬁnancing costs.
The purpose of the paper is to derive a credit crunch indicator that repre-
sents shifts in the supply of loans, which can neither be explained by changes
in the quality of potential borrowers, nor by variations in the reﬁnancing costs
of banks. In a ﬁrst step we control for variations in the ﬁrms’ quality over time
and regress the responses to the credit question on the information about the
creditworthiness of the ﬁrm using a nonlinear binary outcome panel–data model.
In addition to the ﬁrm– and sector–speciﬁc information we also include a set of
time dummies as regressors into our model. The estimated coeﬃcients on the
time dummies are interpreted as additional macroeconomic or bank industry–
speciﬁc factors determining the decision of the loan oﬃcer. In a second step we
separate the variation of lending policies, which is captured by the time dummy
coeﬃcients, from changes in the banks’ reﬁnancing costs. This is achieved by
regressing the estimated time dummy coeﬃcients on the evolution of the reﬁ-
nancing costs over time using a simple linear regression model. The variation
of the time dummy coeﬃcients, which cannot be explained by changes in the
reﬁnancing cost, i.e. the residuals of the linear regression, are ﬁnally interpreted
as bank industry–speciﬁc determinants of credit supply. The more positive the
contribution of the bank industry–speciﬁc determinants of credit supply to the
ﬁrms’ perception of a restrictive willingness to lend (holding constant both the
reﬁnancing costs of banks and the quality of potential borrowers), the higher
the probability that the economy is aﬀected by a credit crunch.
Our results show that the probability of a credit crunch in the German econ-
omy was high in the years 2003 to 2005, following the economic downturn after
3the burst of the New Economy Bubble. In the subsequent boom of the years
2006 to 2008 the credit supply of banks was very lax. Even after controlling for
the on average good quality of the ﬁrms and the low level of reﬁnancing costs,
the banks’ willingness to lend was perceived as accommodating. Most surpris-
ingly, in the latest ﬁnancial crisis, in which banks are much more involved than
in previous recessions due to massive write–downs of toxic assets, the indications
of a credit crunch are rather weak. Only large ﬁrms that mainly negotiate cred-
its with state–owned landes banks and private commercial reported a subdued
willingness of the banks to grant credit, which can neither be explained by the
impaired creditworthiness of these ﬁrms, nor by the large increase of the banks’
ﬁnancing premia on the capital markets.
To our knowledge this paper is the ﬁrst to identify credit crunches by using
direct (qualitative) information about credit supply conditions that is obtained
from a survey among ﬁrms. To some extent our paper is close to the paper by
Borensztein and Lee (2002) who analyzed the Korean credit market situation in
the aftermath of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in 1997/1998 by using ﬁrm–level data.
They pointed out that “one of the crucial issues related to the credit crunch is
the extent to which proﬁtable and viable ﬁrms did or did not have access to
ﬁnance.” They tried to tackle this problem by looking at the characteristics of
ﬁrms that observed reductions in their bank credit volumes. However, since
their dependent variable was credit volume, the identiﬁcation problem still re-
mained and credit supply shifts had to be identiﬁed by including some proxies
for credit demand into the regression. Another strand of the literature used
bank–level data in order to identify a credit crunch, which is typically caused
by banks encountering diﬃculties on the liability side of their balance sheet
and, in particular, in maintaining an adequate level of equity (Peek and Rosen-
gren, 1995; Peek and Rosengren, 2000; Woo, 2003). A major shortcoming of
this approach is, however, that changes in the quality of ﬁrms are not controlled
for. Since diﬀerences in bank capital are likely to be associated with diﬀerences
in borrowers quality, diﬀerences in credit growth may just reﬂect diﬀerences
in ﬁrms’ conditions rather than in banks’ conditions. A rather new literature
therefore proposes to analyze individual loan data together with both, ﬁrm and
bank characteristics. Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) use data on outstanding
4loans extended by Italian banks to Italian ﬁrms, merged with data on corre-
sponding balance sheet indicators of the ﬁrms’ quality. Since the compilation of
a micro–data set with bank–ﬁrm relationships is a challenging task, Albertazzi
and Marchetti (2010) are not able to analyze the evolution of loan supply over
time and only provide a cross–sectional analysis for a speciﬁc point in time after
the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the ﬁrst step of our
approach, the micro–econometric model. In Section 3 the credit crunch indicator
is derived in the second step. Section 4 discusses the of role ﬁrm size and of
bank lending relationships for our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Micro–Econometric Model
We consider the following nonlinear panel–data model for the binary choice
variable yit,
Pr(yit = 1|xit,β,αi) = F(β
′xit + αi), (1)
where xit are the regressors, i = 1,2,...,N denotes the independent ﬁrms and
t = 1,2,...,Ti denotes the observations for the ith unit. F is the cumulative
logistic distribution function. In the pooled model it is assumed that αi =
α. A random eﬀects ( re) model treats the individual–speciﬁc eﬀect αi as an
unobserved random variable with a speciﬁed distribution, typically the normal
distribution. In a ﬁxed eﬀects ( fe) model the αi are also treated as unobserved
random variables, which however may be correlated with the regressors xit. In
short panels the joint estimation of the N ﬁxed eﬀects and the other model
parameters β usually leads to inconsistent estimation of all parameters due to
the incidental parameters problem. One method of consistent estimation is the
conditional maximum likelihood estimator, which is based on a log density for
the ith individual that conditions on the total number of outcomes equal to 1 for
a given individual over time. This leads to the loss of those observations where
yit = 0 or yit = 1 for all t. If we ignore the ﬁrms without any within–group
variation, the sample size decreases from 56946 to 44041 observations.
The big loss of degrees of freedom that is associated with the ﬁxed eﬀects
5model can be avoided if the individual eﬀects are assumed to be random. In
contrast to the random eﬀects model, the ﬁxed eﬀects model makes inference
based only on the intra–ﬁrm variation of the variables. But the random eﬀects
model hinges on the unlikely assumption, that the αi are independent from
all xi. To overcome this limitation we use an approach suggested by Mundlak
(1978) and Chamberlain (1980, 1984) and allow for correlation between αi and
xi. The random eﬀects are expressed as a linear function of the regressors1
αi = γ
′ ¯ xi + ηi, (2)
where ¯ xi denotes the ﬁrm–speciﬁc time averages of the regressors xit, and ηi
is a normally distributed error term. In a linear model it is not restrictive to
decompose αi according to equation (2). But in a nonlinear model, we must
assume that the regression function E(αi|¯ xi) is actually a linear function, and
ηi is independent from xi (Hsiao, 2003, Ch. 7). The probability in the case of
the correlated random eﬀects ( re cham) model can now computed as
Pr(yit = 1|xit, ¯ xi,β,γ,ηi) = F(β
′xit + γ
′ ¯ xi + ηi). (3)
2.1 Data
In all regressions the dependent variable yit is credit, which measures the ﬁrms’
perception of the banks’ credit conditions. It is taken from the Ifo Business
Survey, in which a representative sample of German ﬁrms of the manufacturing
sector are asked to respond to the following question: “How would you assess
the current willingness of banks to extend credit to businesses”? The answers to
choose from are “accommodating”, “normal” and “restrictive”. The dependent
variable is set equal to 1, if the ﬁrms assess the banks’ credit supply policy as
“restrictive”, and 0 if the ﬁrms indicate “normal” or “accommodating”. The
question was introduced in the questionnaire in June 2003 and since then asked
every March and August. In order to gain more information on the eﬀects of the
latest ﬁnancial crisis on the ﬁnancing situation of ﬁrms, the credit question was
1Instead of the ﬁrm–speciﬁc time averages ¯ xi, Chamberlain used xi, the vector of all
explanatory variables across all time periods. Our speciﬁcation (Mundlak’s version) conserves
on parameters.
6included in the regular monthly survey from November 2008 on. The November
2009 survey is the latest survey that is included in the sample. On average we
have 2300 responses to the credit question in each survey.
The regressors xit consist of two groups of variables. The ﬁrst group com-
prises the ﬁrm–speciﬁc and sector–speciﬁc variables, which measure the quality
of the potential borrowers. The ﬁrm–speciﬁc variables vary both, over time and
across ﬁrms, and are also taken from the Ifo Business Survey. In our regressions
we use the ﬁrms’ assessments of the current state of the business (statebus) and
their business expectations for the next six months (comexp) as a proxy for the
quality of the borrower. The survey respondents can characterize their state
of the business as “good”, “satisfactory” or “poor” and their expectations as
“more favorable”, “unchanged” or “more unfavorable”. Thus, both ﬁrm–speciﬁc
regressors are ordinal variables with three categories, which take a value of
− 1, if the ﬁrm’s quality is good (more favorable business expectations, good
state of the business),
− 2, if the ﬁrm’s quality is moderate (unchanged business expectations, sat-
isfactory state of the business),
− 3, if the ﬁrm’s quality is bad (more unfavorable business expectations,
poor state of the business).
Of course other measures, in particular balance sheet ratios, could also be taken
into account as proxies for the information used by the banks in order to evaluate
the quality of potential borrowers. As such ratios are currently not yet available
in the data set, we motivate our choice of the explanatory variables by the
existing evidence from internal surveys, according to which the responses to
these questions can be viewed as proxies for actual balance sheet ﬁgures. In
the so–called “survey of the survey” the Ifo Institute examined the factors that
form the basis for ﬁrms’ replies to the monthly business survey. It turned out
that for the assessment of the current state of the business and the business
expectations for the next six months the ﬁrms mainly rely on hard facts, such
as the proﬁt situation and the turnover (Abberger, Birnbrich, and Seiler, 2009).
In addition to ﬁrm–speciﬁc variables we also include a sector–speciﬁc vari-
able, sectorclimate. The idea here is that a ﬁrm’s creditworthiness is also eval-
uated on the basis of the performance of the economic activity in the business
7sector that a ﬁrm i is operating in. This variable varies over time, but is identical
for all ﬁrms producing in a speciﬁc business sector. The business sectors in man-
ufacturing are deﬁned according to the Classiﬁcation of Economic Activities in
the European Community (NACE rev. 1.1). As a proxy for the sector–speciﬁc
economic activity, we use the Sector Ifo Business Climate Indicator, which is
calculated as the geometric mean of the aggregated balances of the current busi-
ness situation and the business expectations in a speciﬁc business sector. The
balance values are calculated as the diﬀerence of the percentages of the positive
and the negative responses. Table 1 shows that there is considerable variation
of the mean of the Business Climate Indicator across sectors. While for ex-
ample in the chemical sector (DG), which accounts for about 6 percent of the
observations, ﬁrms report on average much more favorable business situations
and expectations, the economic activity in the textile sector (DB with about 5
percent of the observations) is more depressed on average.
Table 1: Sector–speciﬁc Economic Activity
climatesector mean sd N
DA (food products, beverages and tobacco) -6.33 7.14 3313
DB (textiles and textile products) -22.64 15.25 2714
DC (leather and leather products) -22.49 16.77 683
DD (wood and wood products) -17.29 14.56 2209
DE (pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing) -15.22 16.84 8303
DF (coke, reﬁned petroleum products and nuclear fuel) -5.46 34.72 176
DG (chemicals, chemical products and man–made ﬁbres) 3.16 22.74 3693
DH (rubber and plastic products) -13.44 21.30 3623
DI (other non–metallic mineral products) -18.95 17.45 3222
DJ (basic metals and fabricated metal products) -17.15 25.98 8368
DK (machinery and equipment n.e.c.) -11.89 27.28 9248
DL (electrical and optical equipment) -12.49 26.28 6818
DM (transport equipment) -24.69 32.09 1864
DN (not elsewhere classiﬁed) -19.67 17.73 2712
Total -14.04 23.21 56946
The descriptive statistics for the variables are shown in Table 2. The sample
comprises 56946 responses to the credit question over the period 2003 to 2009.
In 39 percent of the cases the ﬁrms assessed the banks’ credit supply policy
as “restrictive”. On average, those ﬁrms are characterized by a poorer state
of the business (i.e. a higher value of statebus), more unfavorable business
8expectations (i.e. a higher value of comexp) and a lower business activity in the
sector they are operating in (i.e. a lower climatesector).
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
credit variable mean sd min max N
1 (restrictive) statebus 2.38 0.65 1 3 21945
comexp 2.16 0.68 1 3 21945
climatesector -18.85 20.65 -70.6 53.6 21945
0 (else) statebus 2.04 0.7 1 3 35001
comexp 2.05 0.63 1 3 35001
climatesector -11.02 24.19 -70.6 53.6 35001
Total statebus 2.17 0.7 1 3 56946
comexp 2.1 0.65 1 3 56946
climatesector -14.04 23.21 -70.6 53.6 56946
Notes: credit = 1, if the ﬁrms assess the banks’ credit supply policy as “restrictive”, credit =
0, if the ﬁrms indicate “normal” or “accommodating”.
The second group of regressors are thought to capture all variation of lending
policies over the business cycle, which is independent from the quality assessment
of the loan oﬃcer. We include a set of T −1 time dummies, where T = 25 is the
number of surveys between June 2003 and November 2009 that are analyzed in
the regressions. In contrast to the ﬁrm–speciﬁc or sector–speciﬁc variables the
time dummies are common to all ﬁrms. The estimated coeﬃcients on the time
dummies are interpreted as additional macroeconomic or bank industry–speciﬁc
factors determining the decision of the loan oﬃcer.
2.2 Regression Results
The results of the logit regressions are shown in Table 3. The coeﬃcients on
the quality measures are signiﬁcant and have the correct sign. If the state
of the business is “bad” or business expectations are “more unfavorable”, the
probability that a ﬁrm perceives the credit supply policy of banks as restrictive
increases. If the economic activity in the sector that a ﬁrm belongs to increases,
the probability of a restrictive credit supply policy decreases. These results
9are robust across the assumption made with respect to αi (column (1) shows
the results of the pooled model, column (2) those of the random eﬀects model,
column (3) those of the correlated random eﬀects model, column (4) those of the
ﬁxed eﬀects model, and column (5) those of the correlated random eﬀects model
with a sample identical to ﬁxed eﬀects model) and the distribution function F
(the results of the linear model are shown in Table 7 in Appendix A; the results
of the probit model are available from the authors upon request).
The coeﬃcients on the time dummies (indicated as t yymm, where yy stands
for the year and mm for the month of the survey) are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero (except for the year 2004) and show a pronounced cyclical behavior.
Starting at their maximum level in 2003, the estimated coeﬃcients continuously
fall and reach their minimum in August 2007. From then on, they start to
increase again until the end of the sample in November 2009. This U–shaped
pattern implies that for a given quality of a ﬁrm, as measured by the ﬁrm and
sector–speciﬁc variables, the ﬁrm’s access to credit was less restrictive in 2007
than in 2003 or 2009 (see Figure 1). Interestingly, the coeﬃcients on the time
dummies are unaﬀected by the way how the ﬁrm–speciﬁc eﬀects are modeled,
except for the case when the individual eﬀects are ignored (pooled logit).
In general, the estimated parameters β from the binary regression model
(which include the coeﬃcients on the time dummies) provide information about
the sign and the statistical signiﬁcance of the relationship between an indepen-
dent variable and the outcome. More substantively meaningful interpretations
are based on the predictive probabilities
c Pr(yit = 1|x
∗, b β, b αi) = F(b β
′x
∗ + b αi), (4)
which are calculated for given values of the regressors x∗. While the calculation
of the predicted probabilities in the case of a pooled logit model is straightfor-
ward, predictions in the case of the ﬁxed or the random eﬀects model can only
be computed under the assumption that αi = 0 for all i. In the conditional ﬁxed
eﬀects logit model no coeﬃcients for time–invariant variables can be estimated.
The time–invariant ﬁxed eﬀects are eliminated by conditioning on xit and the
sum of possible outcomes for yit. In this procedure the constant term becomes
essentially part of the ﬁxed eﬀects and is therefore also eliminated. Since the
10Table 3: Results of the Logit Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
logit logit re logit re cham logit fe logit re cham s2
statebus 0.566∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗
(19.85) (23.48) (19.13) (18.63) (19.13)
comexp 0.124∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(4.84) (6.07) (5.37) (5.30) (5.28)
climatesector -0.007∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(-4.43) (-9.29) (-9.21) (-7.84) (-7.64)
t 0308 0.149∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗ 0.201∗ 0.192∗ 0.191∗
(3.54) (2.62) (2.57) (2.40) (2.33)
t 0403 -0.024 -0.059 -0.063 -0.072 -0.084
(-0.45) (-0.74) (-0.80) (-0.89) (-1.02)
t 0408 -0.044 -0.115 -0.127 -0.140 -0.151
(-0.77) (-1.39) (-1.53) (-1.66) (-1.78)
t 0503 -0.491∗∗∗ -0.811∗∗∗ -0.814∗∗∗ -0.785∗∗∗ -0.792∗∗∗
(-8.94) (-10.06) (-10.09) (-9.59) (-9.62)
t 0508 -0.608∗∗∗ -1.004∗∗∗ -1.006∗∗∗ -0.975∗∗∗ -0.979∗∗∗
(-10.57) (-12.06) (-12.07) (-11.56) (-11.57)
t 0603 -0.789∗∗∗ -1.369∗∗∗ -1.388∗∗∗ -1.374∗∗∗ -1.394∗∗∗
(-9.98) (-14.36) (-14.54) (-14.09) (-14.47)
t 0608 -0.963∗∗∗ -1.656∗∗∗ -1.677∗∗∗ -1.652∗∗∗ -1.664∗∗∗
(-11.93) (-16.76) (-16.96) (-16.38) (-16.68)
t 0703 -1.190∗∗∗ -2.042∗∗∗ -2.071∗∗∗ -2.057∗∗∗ -2.066∗∗∗
(-12.83) (-18.94) (-19.19) (-18.59) (-19.00)
t 0708 -1.356∗∗∗ -2.244∗∗∗ -2.273∗∗∗ -2.243∗∗∗ -2.259∗∗∗
(-14.88) (-20.39) (-20.65) (-19.88) (-20.28)
t 0803 -1.134∗∗∗ -1.877∗∗∗ -1.901∗∗∗ -1.861∗∗∗ -1.864∗∗∗
(-14.09) (-18.65) (-18.88) (-18.18) (-18.45)
t 0808 -1.289∗∗∗ -2.109∗∗∗ -2.115∗∗∗ -2.056∗∗∗ -2.043∗∗∗
(-20.11) (-23.23) (-23.31) (-22.36) (-22.27)
t 0811 -0.919∗∗∗ -1.424∗∗∗ -1.413∗∗∗ -1.338∗∗∗ -1.316∗∗∗
(-14.70) (-16.67) (-16.53) (-15.42) (-15.29)
t 0812 -0.786∗∗∗ -1.198∗∗∗ -1.174∗∗∗ -1.095∗∗∗ -1.057∗∗∗
(-11.24) (-13.09) (-12.83) (-11.77) (-11.51)
t 0901 -0.879∗∗∗ -1.327∗∗∗ -1.301∗∗∗ -1.215∗∗∗ -1.187∗∗∗
(-13.20) (-15.26) (-14.95) (-13.74) (-13.57)
t 0902 -0.686∗∗∗ -0.965∗∗∗ -0.929∗∗∗ -0.843∗∗∗ -0.820∗∗∗
(-9.90) (-10.98) (-10.56) (-9.39) (-9.27)
t 0903 -0.785∗∗∗ -1.085∗∗∗ -1.047∗∗∗ -0.950∗∗∗ -0.935∗∗∗
(-11.57) (-12.44) (-11.99) (-10.64) (-10.61)
t 0904 -0.759∗∗∗ -1.031∗∗∗ -0.993∗∗∗ -0.902∗∗∗ -0.895∗∗∗
(-11.52) (-11.97) (-11.52) (-10.25) (-10.29)
t 0905 -0.654∗∗∗ -0.854∗∗∗ -0.817∗∗∗ -0.726∗∗∗ -0.722∗∗∗
(-10.04) (-9.97) (-9.53) (-8.28) (-8.33)
t 0906 -0.686∗∗∗ -0.894∗∗∗ -0.857∗∗∗ -0.768∗∗∗ -0.769∗∗∗
(-11.01) (-10.66) (-10.21) (-8.97) (-9.06)
t 0907 -0.489∗∗∗ -0.606∗∗∗ -0.573∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗ -0.497∗∗∗
(-8.40) (-7.39) (-6.98) (-5.90) (-5.97)
t 0908 -0.445∗∗∗ -0.525∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗ -0.430∗∗∗ -0.443∗∗∗
(-7.78) (-6.41) (-6.09) (-5.14) (-5.32)
t 0909 -0.399∗∗∗ -0.445∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗ -0.348∗∗∗ -0.361∗∗∗
(-6.48) (-5.13) (-4.85) (-3.92) (-4.09)
t 0910 -0.456∗∗∗ -0.566∗∗∗ -0.544∗∗∗ -0.482∗∗∗ -0.493∗∗∗
(-7.99) (-6.99) (-6.72) (-5.83) (-5.98)
t 0911 -0.317∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗ -0.307∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗
(-5.44) (-4.58) (-4.34) (-3.64) (-3.89)
statebus m 1.166∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗
(12.84) (2.87)
comexp m 0.026 -0.072
(0.24) (-0.79)
cons -1.497∗∗∗ -1.544∗∗∗ -3.925∗∗∗ -1.300∗∗∗
(-16.93) (-16.42) (-15.75) (-6.14)
lnsig2u
cons 1.662∗∗∗ 1.638∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗
(47.82) (47.02) (17.80)
N 56946 56946 56946 44041 44041
AIC 70429.91 52760.41 52577.71 32677.40 47147.43
LogL -3.5e+04 -2.6e+04 -2.6e+04 -1.6e+04 -2.4e+04
t statistics, which are shown in parentheses, are clustering on individual ﬁrms in the
case of the pooled model (1).
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001





















ﬁxed eﬀects are not estimated, it is not possible to compute predicted proba-
bilities or marginal eﬀects with the estimated coeﬃcients. In the case of the
random eﬀects model the calculation of predicted probabilities depends on the
density function of the estimated random eﬀects (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).
If predicted probabilities are calculated under the assumption that αi = 0 for all
i, the result may be diﬀerent from the unconditional probability, which should
take account of the estimated distribution of αi. Thus, any calculation of pre-
dicted probabilities in a random or ﬁxed eﬀects model requires an assumption
on the distribution of the unobserved αi, which may lead to a signiﬁcant bias in
the predictions.
Another problem that is related to the calculation of predicted probabilities
is the choice of x∗. If for example we were interested in the probability of a
restrictive credit supply for a creditworthy ﬁrm, we should be able to identify
values for the explanatory variables that are compatible with a good quality of
the potential borrower. While such a decision would be rather uncontroversial
with respect to the ordinal variables statebus and comexp, there is no “natural”
12reference value for a continuous variable like climatesector. Finally, also in a
non–linear model it holds that that the probability of a restrictive credit supply
is larger at a given point in time, the greater the coeﬃcient of the respective
time dummies is. For these reasons we decided to not calculate predictions in
the case of the non–linear model and to focus the subsequent analysis on the
estimated coeﬃcients of the time dummies.
A more meaningful interpretation of the estimated coeﬃcients can however
be given in the context of a linear probability model:
Pr(yit = 1|xit,β,αi) = β
′xit + αi. (5)
In this class of models the estimated coeﬃcients on the time dummies are per-
centage points contributions to the probability that a ﬁrm perceives the current
willingness of banks to extend credit to businesses as restrictive, everything else
being equal. It is well known that the disadvantage of the linear probability
model is that the ﬁtted probabilities may fall outside of the zero–one interval,
which, however, does not apply in our case.2 Table 7 in Appendix A shows that
for a given ﬁrm the probability of a restrictive credit supply was, depending on
the assumption made with respect to αi, between 27 and 30 percentage points
lower in August 2008 than in August 2003.
Another advantage of the the linear probability model is that we can easily
implement instrumental variable regressions in order to account for the potential
endogeneity of the regressors. If a ﬁrm faces a restrictive credit supply, proﬁtable
investments cannot be ﬁnanced. Thus, it is possible that the ﬁrms assessment
about the banks’ credit supply policy credit may have an impact on the quality
of the ﬁrm as measured by the regressors statebus and comexp. Whether or
not this leads to the problem of endogenous regressors, crucially depends on
the time horizon of the survey respondents. On the one hand, today’s access
to credit is likely to aﬀect investment projects only in the future. On the other
hand, the responses to the question about the current state of the business and
the short–run business expectations may already incorporate these long–run
eﬀects of today’s credit supply conditions. If our ﬁrm–speciﬁc regressors were
endogenous, the pooled OLS and the ﬁxed eﬀects estimators would be biased
2These results are available from the authors upon request.
13and there would only be little trust in the estimates of the probability models.
In order to account for the potential endogeneity of the regressors statebus and
comexp, we estimate both the pooled and the ﬁxed eﬀects linear probability
model with IV methods (see the last two columns (5) and (6) in Table 7 in
Appendix A). Various tests summarized in Appendix B show that there is no
evidence of weak or endogenous instruments. Furthermore, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that statebus and comexp are exogenous. Based on these
results we assume that also our baseline logit regressions are not subject to
endogeneity problems. Finally, all the conclusions drawn henceforth based on
the logit models are almost identical to the results of the linear IV models.
3 Credit Crunch Indicator
In the second step we separate the variation of lending policies over the business
cycle, which is captured by the time dummy coeﬃcients, from changes in the
determinants of credit supply, which are caused by factors other than the ﬁrm–
speciﬁc quality. From the credit crunch deﬁnition of Bernanke and Lown (1991)
follows that a shift in the credit supply of banks can also be explained by changes
in the banks’ reﬁnancing costs. If reﬁnancing costs increase, banks will reduce
their credit supply, implying that new loans are provided at a higher interest
rate, everything else being equal.
Under the assumption that the costs of credit are taken into account by the
survey respondents when assessing the banks’ lending policies, we isolate the
shifts in credit supply that reﬂect a credit crunch by regressing the estimated
time dummy coeﬃcients on the evolution of the reﬁnancing costs over time using
a simple linear regression model:
c tdt = c + δ
′it + εt. (6)
c tdt corresponds to the estimated coeﬃcients on the time dummies t yymm shown
in Table 3, c is the intercept, and it is an interest rate spread, which is deﬁned
as the average government bond rate (average yield on all public debt securities
outstanding) over the three–month treasury bills rate.3 The variation of the time
3In Germany, bank debt securities are an important source of ﬁnancing credit business.
14dummy coeﬃcients, which cannot be explained by changes in the reﬁnancing
cost, i.e. the residuals εt of the linear regression, are ﬁnally interpreted as
bank industry–speciﬁc determinants of credit supply. The more positive the
contribution of the bank industry–speciﬁc determinants of credit supply to the
ﬁrms’ perception of a restrictive willingness to lend (holding constant both the
reﬁnancing costs of banks and the quality of potential borrowers), the higher
the probability that the economy is aﬀected by a credit crunch.
The estimated coeﬃcients on the interest rate spread δ are positive and sig-
niﬁcant, implying that higher reﬁnancing costs may contribute to a leftward
shift of the credit supply curve. The residuals of the regression, which we de-
note as credit crunch indicator, are depicted in Figure 2. Irrespective of the
speciﬁcation of the panel–data model, our results show that the probability of
a credit crunch in the German economy was high in the years 2003 to 2005,
following the economic downturn after the burst of the New Economy Bubble.
In the subsequent boom of the years 2006 to 2008 the credit supply of banks was
very lax. Even after controlling for the on average good quality of the ﬁrms and
the low level of reﬁnancing costs, the banks’ willingness to lend was perceived as
accommodating. Most surprisingly, in the latest ﬁnancial crisis, in which banks
are much more involved than in previous recessions due to massive write–downs
of toxic assets, the indications of a credit crunch are rather weak.
Since a straightforward interpretation of the estimated coeﬃcients of a non–
linear probability model is diﬃcult, we also consider the results of the linear
model. Figure 3, which compares the credit crunch indicator resulting from
a correlated random eﬀects linear model (depicted on the left axis) with the
With about 22% of the banks’ liabilities, debt securities issued are one of the largest items
in the banks’ aggregate balance sheet, after deposits with about 43% and liabilities against
other banks with about 32%. Instead of using the average yield on all bank debt securities
outstanding for calculating the interest rate spread, we took the risk–free government bond
rate, so that the interest rate spread actually reﬂects a term spread. The reason for this
is simply the fact that during the ﬁnancial crisis banks had to pay a risk premium over
government bond rates (reaching 90 basis points in December 2008), which per se indicates
that banks were in trouble. And it is exactly this type of trouble, which could lead to a
credit crunch and, hence, should not be taken into account when calculating the credit crunch
indicator.















credit crunch indicator resulting from a correlated random eﬀects logit model
(depicted on the right axis), shows that both indicators evolve similarly over
time.4 In the case of the linear model, the credit crunch indicator reveals that
for a given quality of ﬁrms and given reﬁnancing costs of banks the probability
of a restrictive credit supply was more than 10 percentage points higher in 2003
than by the end of the year 2009, where the credit crunch indicator is close to
zero.
An explanation for the result that the credit crunch was more pronounced at
the beginning of the decade than during the latest ﬁnancial crisis can be given
with the help of Figure 4, which shows the average shares of the negative re-
sponses to the survey questions across ﬁrms over time and the reﬁnancing costs.
Both periods of economic downturn are characterized by a quite similar pattern.
A large share of ﬁrms assesses the banks’ willingness to lend as restrictive, and
at the same time many ﬁrms report a poor state of their business and more
4Our results are also robust across models with alternative assumptions about the distri-
bution function F, see Appendix C.
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unfavorable business expectations for the next six months. Moreover, interest
rate spreads are higher than during boom times. A comparison of both periods
shows, however, that despite the fact that both, the average quality of ﬁrms
and the reﬁnancing situation was better in 2003 than in 2009, the share of ﬁrms
indicating a restrictive credit supply was about 10 percentage points higher in
2003 than in 2009. And it is exactly this gap that is reﬂected by the credit
crunch indicator.
The two–step procedure for calculating the credit crunch indicator is required
since the interest rate spread it and the time dummies tyymm cannot be simulta-
neously used as regressors in the ﬁrst–stage regression due to collinearities. The
reason for this is simply that the T observations for the interest rate spread are
identical to all ﬁrms, implying that their information is entirely captured by the
time dummies. One way of avoiding the two–step procedure is to replace the
T − 1 time dummies in regression (3) by a higher–degree polynomial that best
possibly reproduces the evolution of the estimated time dummy coeﬃcients. In
order to get an idea of how lending policies vary over the business cycle over and
17Figure 4: Determinants of the Credit Crunch Indicator
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above the quality assessment of the loan oﬃcer, we looked at the estimates of
the time dummy coeﬃcients in Figure 1 and decided to estimate the time trend
of the variation of lending policies by a fourth degree polynomial. We then
included both, the polynomial and the reﬁnancing costs (labeled ‘reﬁnancing’),
as non–ﬁrm–speciﬁc regressors in our non–linear panel model (3) and derived
the credit crunch indicator directly from the estimated coeﬃcients of the poly-
nomial (see Table 8 in Appendix A for the regression results). Figure 5 shows
that the resulting credit crunch indicator of the one–step procedure using a
polynomial time trend evolves similarly to the credit crunch indicator resulting
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from the two–step approach (see Figure 10 in Appendix A for the credit crunch
indicators resulting under diﬀerent model assumptions).
4 On the Role of Firm Size and Bank Relation-
ships
The size of a ﬁrm is often viewed as an important determinant of a ﬁrm’s access
to credit. According to the bank lending view, which highlights the response of
the supply of bank loans in the transmission of monetary policy, ﬁnancial mar-
kets are characterized by imperfections and bank assets (loans, securities) are
imperfect substitutes (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). In the empirical literature,
the relevance of the bank lending channel has been a controversial issue, due to
the problem of identifying shifts in the supply of bank loans. In order to address
the identiﬁcation problem, several studies have considered disaggregated data
and found that, following a monetary contraction, bank credit to small ﬁrms
19is reduced more than bank credit to large ﬁrms (see for example Gertler and
Gilchrist, 1994, and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 1995). The main reason for this
result is that small ﬁrms are more dependent on bank credit as they hardly have
access to alternative ﬁnancing sources, such as ﬁnancial markets.
In order to analyze whether the size of ﬁrms has any inﬂuence on our credit
crunch indicator, we included a dummy variable into the micro–econometric
model that takes a value of 1, if a ﬁrm has 250 employees and more, and 0
otherwise. The information about the number of employees is also taken from
the Ifo Business Survey. Table 4 shows that roughly two thirds of the ﬁrms
in our sample are classiﬁed as small according to this deﬁnition. Since we are
mainly interested in the variation of lending policies over time we additionally
introduced a set of interaction terms by multiplying the time dummies with the
ﬁrm size dummy.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
mean(credit) N
Firm size
< 250 employees 0.39 37188
≥ 250 employees 0.38 19758
Bank relationship
savings banks 0.38 11484
landes banks 0.42 1755
credit cooperatives 0.35 5108
private commercial banks 0.36 12156
other banks 0.39 3510
Another interesting issue is whether the category of bank, with which the
ﬁrm is primarily negotiating credits, has any inﬂuence on the ﬁrm’s assessment
of credit supply. A peculiarity of the German banking system is its three–pillar
structure based on private commercial banks, banks governed by public law
and credit cooperatives. The private commercial banks include major banks
such as Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank; banks governed by public law are
the roughly 500 “Sparkassen” (savings banks) and the “Landesbanken” (landes
banks); cooperative banks include the roughly 1200 “Volks– und Raiﬀeisen-
banken” and their two central institutions DZ Bank and WGZ–Bank. During
the ﬁnancial crisis in particular the state–owned landes banks and some of the
20large private commercial banks have been hard hit, while both savings banks
and cooperative banking institutions turned out to be relatively stable.
In a special question that was included in the questionnaire of the Ifo Busi-
ness Survey in June 2009, ﬁrms were asked about the category of bank, with
which they are predominantly negotiating credits. The answers to choose from
were “savings banks”, “landes banks”, “credit cooperatives”, “private commer-
cial banks” and “other banks”. We assumed that the ﬁrms have had the same
bank relationship over the entire sample period5 and constructed four dummy
variables (control group = savings banks), which was introduced in the micro–
econometric model as a set of interaction terms by multiplying the time dummies
with the four bank dummies. Table 4 shows that the information about the bank
relationship is available for about 60 percent of the observations in our sample.
The results of both regressions with interaction terms are shown in Table 5.
In this Section we only applied the correlated random eﬀects model since there
is signiﬁcant panel heterogeneity and the estimates of the correlated random
eﬀects model turned out to be very close to those of the ﬁxed eﬀects model (see
Table 3, columns 4 and 5). Moreover, we can avoid the loss of almost 13000
observations, which is related to the conditional maximum likelihood estimation
of the ﬁxed eﬀects model. Since we only allowed the ﬁrm size dummy and the
bank relationship dummy to interact with the time dummies, the coeﬃcients
on the ﬁrm–speciﬁc regressors are identical across groups. As in the baseline
regression the coeﬃcients of the state of the business, the business expectations
and the sector–speciﬁc business climate are signiﬁcant and have the correct
negative sign. The coeﬃcients on the time dummies are shown separately for
each subgroup. For both regressions, the ﬁrst column shows the coeﬃcients
on the time dummies of the control group, i.e. small ﬁrms in the model with
ﬁrm size interaction and savings banks in the model with bank relationship
5It is common practice in credit ﬁnancing for close ties to exist between ﬁrms and banks.
One of the countries where relationship lending is supposed to be especially prevalent is
Germany, often cited as the classical example of a bank–based system with strong customer–
borrower–relationships (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). An important indicator to measure rela-
tionship lending is the duration of a bank–borrower relationship (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).
According to survey evidence the average duration of bank relationships in Germany lies
between 15 and 20 years (Elsas, 2005).
21Table 5: Results with Interactions
Interaction with ﬁrm size Interaction with bank relationship
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22interaction. The columns to the right of the ﬁrst column show a group–speciﬁc
intercept term in the ﬁrst row and the coeﬃcients on the interaction terms for
each subgroup in the rows below. The sum of the group intercept and the
coeﬃcients on the interaction terms tells us whether the willingness to lend for
this subgroup at a certain point in time is greater or smaller than in the control
group. We performed joint Wald tests for each subgroup and could reject the
null hypothesis that the estimated interaction terms are zero.
The credit crunch indicator for each subgroup in the two models is com-
puted as before. Instead, however, of running a single equation regression, we
estimated a system of seemingly unrelated regression equations and restricted
the coeﬃcient on the interest rate spread to be the same across all subgroups.
The following results stand out. First, while in the years before 2008 large ﬁrms
faced much more favorable credit conditions than small ﬁrms, one of the char-
acteristics of the latest ﬁnancial crisis is that in particular large ﬁrms reported
a more subdued willingness of the banks to grant credit (see Figure 6). Thus,
large ﬁrms were likely to face a credit crunch in Germany, whereas the provi-
sion of credit for small businesses was perceived as ample, given the impaired
creditworthiness of these ﬁrms and the large increase of ﬁnancing premia on the
capital markets.
Second, one of the reasons why large ﬁrms were more aﬀected by the ﬁ-
nancial crisis than small ﬁrms has to do with the bank relationships that the
ﬁrms maintain. Table 6 reveals that large ﬁrms typically demand credit from
private commercial banks and landes banks, and hence from those banks that
were mostly aﬀected by the ﬁnancial crisis in Germany. The customers of credit
cooperatives and savings banks are almost exclusively small ﬁrms. Given this
connection the credit crunch indicators derived from the model with bank re-
lationship interaction gives a picture that is quite similar to that of the model
with ﬁrm size interaction (see Figure 7). Before 2008 customers of private com-
mercial banks and landes banks reported a less restrictive credit supply than
customers of credit cooperatives and savings banks, given an identical quality
of the ﬁrms and the same reﬁnancing costs across banks. The situation changed
with the ﬁnancial crisis. Our results indicate that in 2009 mainly customers
of landes banks and private commercial banks were aﬀected by adverse credit
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conditions, while small ﬁrms that are getting loans from credit cooperatives and
savings banks reported a much better credit market situation.
Table 6: Bank Relationship and Firm Size




private commercial banks 50%
other banks 51%
Notes: In the special question of the Ifo Business Survey in June 2009 about the ﬁrms’ bank
relationships 60% of the ﬁrms in our sample provided the requested information about the
main lender. For each banking group the Table shows the share of large ﬁrms.
An explanation for the result that the situation during the ﬁnancial crisis
was so diﬀerent from the situation in 2003/2004 can be given by the evolution of
the banks’ capital ratio. An important factor which may lead to a contraction
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in credit supply is related to the diﬃculties that banks encounter on the liability
side of their balance sheet and, in particular, in maintaining an adequate level of
capital, be it connected with prudential regulation or market discipline. This is
the reason why the label capital crunch is often used synonymously with a credit
crunch (Bernanke and Lown, 1991). Figure 8 shows that the banks’ capital ratio,
and mainly that of private commercial banks, was declining in the years 2003 and
2004. However, during the ﬁnancial crisis capital ratios do not seem to impose
any restrictions on the lending activity of banks, as the share of capital in total
assets increased from 4% in the beginning of 2008 to about 4.5% by the end of
2009. This increase, which is mainly due to the crisis–hit private commercial
banks and landes banks, can be explained by the massive public sector equity
support to banks. In October 2008 the Financial Markets Stabilization Fund
was established in Germany, with the purpose of stabilizing the ﬁnancial market
by overcoming liquidity shortages and by creating the framework conditions for
a strengthening of the capital base of ﬁnancial–sector institutions. Among the
various instruments, the Fund participates in the recapitalization of ﬁnancial–
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sector enterprizes, which amounted to 25 billions of euros until the end of 2009,
and hence to approximately 0.6% of average total assets of private commercial
banks and landes banks in 2009.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a micro data approach to the identiﬁcation of credit crunches.
Using a survey among German ﬁrms which regularly queries the ﬁrms’ assess-
ment of the current willingness of banks to extend credit we estimate the prob-
ability of a restrictive credit supply policy by time taking into account the cred-
itworthiness of borrowers. Creditworthiness is approximated by ﬁrm–speciﬁc
factors, e.g. the ﬁrms’ assessment of their current business situation and their
business expectations for the next six months. After controlling for the banks’
reﬁnancing costs, which are also likely to aﬀect the supply of loans, we derive a
credit crunch indicator, which measures that part of the shift in the willingness
to lend that is neither explained by ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors nor by reﬁnancing costs.
26Our results show that the probability of a credit crunch in the German
economy was high in the years 2003 to 2005, following the economic downturn
after the burst of the New Economy Bubble. In the subsequent boom of the years
2006 to 2008 the credit supply of banks was very lax. Even after controlling for
the on average good quality of the ﬁrms and the low level of reﬁnancing costs, the
banks’ willingness to lend was perceived as accommodating. Most surprisingly,
in the ﬁnancial crisis, in which banks were much more involved than in previous
recessions due to massive write–downs of toxic assets, the indications of a credit
crunch are rather weak. Only large ﬁrms that mainly negotiate credits with
state–owned landes banks reported a subdued willingness of the banks to grant
credit, which can neither be explained by the impaired creditworthiness of these
ﬁrms, nor by the large increase of ﬁnancing premia on the capital markets.
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31Appendices
A Regression Results (Robustness)
Table 7: Results of the Linear Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
linear linear re linear re cham linear fe linear iv linear iv fe
statebus 0.122∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(20.53) (16.23) (13.09) (12.96) (5.20) (4.16)
comexp 0.027∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.016
(4.79) (4.59) (4.03) (3.88) (-0.27) (-0.81)
climatesector -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(-4.33) (-5.31) (-5.27) (-4.63) (-2.39) (-6.19)
t 0308 0.033∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.021
(3.30) (2.87) (2.84) (2.68) (2.46) (1.65)
t 0403 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.014
(-0.94) (-1.05) (-1.07) (-1.03) (-1.04) (-1.03)
t 0408 -0.018 -0.022 -0.023 -0.023 -0.021 -0.030∗
(-1.39) (-1.74) (-1.82) (-1.83) (-1.42) (-2.13)
t 0503 -0.121∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(-9.53) (-9.60) (-9.58) (-9.07) (-8.86) (-9.11)
t 0508 -0.148∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗
(-11.27) (-11.33) (-11.31) (-10.78) (-10.02) (-10.85)
t 0603 -0.182∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗
(-10.60) (-11.37) (-11.46) (-10.91) (-9.75) (-12.65)
t 0608 -0.211∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗
(-12.49) (-13.46) (-13.58) (-12.89) (-10.44) (-14.84)
t 0703 -0.237∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗
(-12.65) (-13.84) (-14.01) (-13.22) (-10.12) (-15.34)
t 0708 -0.262∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.262∗∗∗
(-14.80) (-15.72) (-15.91) (-14.91) (-12.07) (-17.20)
t 0803 -0.236∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗
(-14.45) (-14.89) (-15.05) (-14.08) (-11.11) (-14.95)
t 0808 -0.275∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗
(-21.67) (-21.39) (-21.44) (-20.07) (-13.16) (-16.20)
t 0811 -0.214∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗
(-15.28) (-14.21) (-14.08) (-12.96) (-8.00) (-9.01)
t 0812 -0.183∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗
(-11.47) (-10.88) (-10.64) (-9.68) (-6.19) (-6.62)
t 0901 -0.204∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗
(-13.49) (-12.45) (-12.16) (-11.08) (-8.62) (-9.16)
t 0902 -0.157∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗
(-9.91) (-8.63) (-8.28) (-7.39) (-7.05) (-6.76)
t 0903 -0.180∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗
(-11.63) (-9.96) (-9.57) (-8.50) (-9.11) (-8.22)
t 0904 -0.174∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.128∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(-11.57) (-9.76) (-9.37) (-8.35) (-9.21) (-8.22)
t 0905 -0.149∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗
(-9.97) (-8.15) (-7.77) (-6.83) (-7.70) (-6.36)
t 0906 -0.158∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗
(-10.98) (-8.87) (-8.48) (-7.48) (-9.34) (-7.60)
t 0907 -0.113∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗
(-8.24) (-6.37) (-6.01) (-5.20) (-7.33) (-5.21)
t 0908 -0.105∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗
(-7.73) (-5.69) (-5.38) (-4.64) (-6.84) (-4.65)
t 0909 -0.094∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗
(-6.44) (-4.59) (-4.31) (-3.62) (-6.14) (-3.91)
t 0910 -0.109∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗
(-8.10) (-6.11) (-5.84) (-5.07) (-6.96) (-5.04)
t 0911 -0.078∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗





cons 0.183∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.019 0.319∗∗∗ 0.131∗
(9.74) (19.66) (0.63) (19.33) (2.03)
N 56946 56946 56946 56946 43146 42833
AIC 74198.38 . . 41008.76 56122.64 29738.73
R2 0.091 . . 0.095 0.086 0.094
t statistics, which are shown in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity and, in the case of the
pooled models (1) and (5), clustering on individual ﬁrms.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
32Table 8: Regression with Time Trend (Logit and Linear Model)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
logit logit re logit re cham logit fe linear linear re linear re cham linear fe
statebus 0.562∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(19.85) (23.38) (19.02) (18.54) (20.63) (24.01) (19.49) (13.00)
comexp 0.127∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(5.00) (6.36) (5.69) (5.65) (4.79) (5.86) (5.16) (3.93)
climatesector -0.007∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(-6.15) (-12.87) (-13.15) (-12.09) (-5.19) (-11.40) (-11.71) (-7.25)
t 0.011 0.018 0.019 0.020 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(1.31) (1.58) (1.66) (1.70) (-0.83) (-0.32) (-0.21) (0.04)
t2 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(-4.27) (-5.41) (-5.50) (-5.40) (-2.77) (-3.87) (-3.98) (-3.80)
t3 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(3.64) (5.08) (5.19) (5.13) (2.59) (3.99) (4.11) (3.75)
t4 -0.000∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗
(-2.48) (-3.81) (-3.95) (-3.94) (-1.71) (-3.06) (-3.19) (-2.86)
reﬁnancing 0.103∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(3.67) (6.12) (6.46) (6.66) (3.92) (6.38) (6.78) (5.94)
statebus m 1.165∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(12.86) (13.18)
comexp m 0.018 0.003
(0.17) (0.24)
cons -1.584∗∗∗ -1.821∗∗∗ -4.216∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ -0.010 0.288∗∗∗




N 56946 56946 56946 44041 56946 56946 56946 56946
AIC 70452.63 52800.07 52617.48 32714.27 74218.53 . . 41046.10
LogL -3.5e+04 -2.6e+04 -2.6e+04 -1.6e+04 -3.7e+04 . . -2.1e+04
t statistics, which are shown in parentheses, are robust to heteroskedasticity in the case of the linear models and, in the case of the
linear pooled model (5), clustering on individual ﬁrms.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
B Instrumental Variable Regression
In order to account for the potential endogeneity of the regressors statebus and
comexp, we estimate both the pooled and the ﬁxed eﬀects linear probability
model with IV methods (see the last two columns (5) and (6) in Table 7 in
Appendix A).6 As instruments we use ﬁve lags of an additional variable, proexp,
which is also taken out of the Ifo Business Survey and which measures the
survey respondents expectations about their domestic production in the next
three months. Similar to statebus and comexp, proexp is an ordinal variable
with three categories, “increasing”, “unchanged” and “decreasing”. Since the
dependent variable credit is binary, the error term is heteroscedastic and we
calculate heteroscedasticity–robust standard errors. To test the validity of our
overidentifying restrictions we calculate Hansen’s J–statistic, which is 1.92 (1.02)
in the case of the pooled (ﬁxed eﬀects) model. With 3 degrees of freedom this
6The IV regressions were performed using the Stata commands ivreg2 and xtivreg2, written
by Schaﬀer (2005) and Baum, Schaﬀer, and Stillman (2010).
33results in a p–value of 0.589 (0.796), implying that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that all instruments are valid.
The exogeneity of statebus and comexp is addressed using a C–test. If
statebus and comexp are exogenous, we can additionally use these variables as
their own instruments. Since the moments used in the IV approaches are strict
subsets of the instruments used in the exogenous case, the validity of the ad-
ditional instruments can be tested by a Sargan (Hansen) diﬀerence test. The
C–statistic for the pooled (ﬁxed eﬀects) model is 3.28 (2.54) with 2 degrees of
freedom resulting in a p–value of 0.194 (0.281). So we cannot reject at every
usual signiﬁcance level the null hypothesis that statebus and comexp are exoge-
nous.
An additional issue in IV regressions is the weakness of the instruments. If
instruments are weak, the estimates are biased even in large but ﬁnite samples
and the estimated standard errors are too small, leading to size distortions
of the signiﬁcance tests for endogenous regressors (Nelson and Startz, 1990;
Bound, Jaeger, and Baker, 1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997). In order to address
these problems, we perform weak instruments tests proposed by Stock and Yogo
(2002). Our null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak, in the sense
that the maximal relative bias of the IV estimation in relation to OLS and the
maximal size distortion are unacceptably large. When we choose 5% for the
maximal relative bias and do not tolerate an actual test size greater than 10%,
we can reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments for both, the pooled and
the ﬁxed eﬀects model.
To sum up, the tests show that there is no evidence of weak or endogenous
instruments. Furthermore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that statebus
and comexp are exogenous.
34C Credit Crunch Indicator (Robustness)
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